Ten years from the crash: time to row back on financial regulation and compliance? by Meeks, Geoff & Velu, Chander
Ten	years	from	the	crash:	time	to	row	back	on
financial	regulation	and	compliance?
The	collapse	of	Lehman	Brothers	on	15	September	2008	was	the	most	significant	single	event	of	the	‘Great	Financial
Crisis’	(GFC).	In	his	new	book,	Crashed,	Adam	Tooze	writes	that,	“After	September	15,	2008,	avoiding	another
Lehman	became	an	idee	fixe	of	crisis	managers	around	the	world.”	And	since	then	one	of	the	fastest-growing
activities	in	the	US	and	the	UK	has	been	regulation	of	the	financial	sector	and	the	associated	compliance	processes
within	financial	institutions.
One	arm	of	this	development	has	been	tighter	prudential	regulation	–	requiring	banks	to	hold	larger	margins	of	assets
over	liabilities,	so	that	they	can	better	survive	shocks	without	becoming	insolvent.	But	the	arm	we	consider	here	has
been	regulation	of	banks’	conduct	–	to	reduce	the	detriment	caused	to	borrowers,	investors	and	other	stakeholders
by	misinformation	and	conflicts	of	interest.
This	has	been	costly:	just	one	of	the	UK’s	new	financial	regulators,	the	Financial	Conduct	Authority,	costs	over	£500
million	a	year	to	run;	individual	banks	have	taken	on	many	hundreds	of	compliance	officers	at	the	expense	of	their
bottom	line;	globally,	the	regulators	have	forced	banks	to	pay	out	some	£260	billion	in	fines,	penalties	and	redress
between	2012	and	2016	(the	UK	big	four,	£70	billion).
Some	believe	these	costs	are	unwarranted.	In	the	United	States,	President	Trump	“drove	out”	the	head	of	the
Consumer	Finance	Protection	Bureau	(CFPB),	Richard	Cordray,	and	nominated	Mick	Mulvaney	as	the	new	head.	Mr
Mulvaney’s	attitude	to	regulation	was	well	known.	He	had	called	the	CFPB	“a	sick	joke”,	and	said	he	wished	it	didn’t
exist.	This	attitude	was	shared	by	many	in	the	banking	industry	in	the	US,	who	believed	it	was	time	to	row	back	on
financial	regulation	and	the	associated	compliance:	a	Financial	Times	headline	on	4	Feb.	2017	read:	“Wall	Street
welcomes	Trump	the	deregulator”[i].
Those	who	led	banks	at	the	time	of	the	GFC	were	mostly	replaced	soon	after.	Their	replacements	are	now
themselves	giving	way	to	a	new	generation.	Memories	are	fading	of	the	risky	degree	of	latitude	in	the	regulatory
regime	in	place	at	the	time	of	Lehman’s	failure.	So	it	may	be	worth	recalling	some	of	the	forgotten	misconduct	in	the
banking	sector	leading	up	to	the	GFC,	and	then	some	of	the	detrimental	consequences	of	the	GFC	for	western
economies.
Misconduct:	reminders
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One	area	in	which	‘light	touch’	regulation	and	weak	compliance	contributed	to	the	GFC	is	the	provision	of	mortgage
finance.	Misconduct	has	been	identified	throughout	the	‘supply	chain’	which	channeled	international	savings	to	US
mortgage	borrowers.
It	all	began	with	praiseworthy	objectives:	helping	previously	ineligible	families	to	borrow	to	buy	their	own	homes.
Mortgages	were	made	more	affordable	and	flexible	in	their	early	years,	with	low	‘teaser’	interest	rates	and	options	to
miss	repayments	(adding	to	the	principal);	high	fees	were	not	paid	by	the	borrower	at	the	outset	but	added	to	the
principal;	and	higher	interest	rates	kicked	in	only	later.	A	new	cohort	of	homebuyers	was	attracted;	and	this
stimulated	a	housing	boom	and	rising	home	prices.	So	long	as	prices	continued	rising,	borrowers	who	could	not	meet
the	sharply	increased	payments	after	the	teaser	years	could	sell	their	home	and	pay	off	the	principal.	Alternatively
they	could	default,	leaving	the	lender	with	an	asset	which	could	fetch	more	than	they	were	owed.
While	prices	continued	rising,	the	lenders	flourished:	paradoxically,	these	‘low	quality’,	subprime	borrowers,	who	had
previously	been	excluded	from	the	mortgage	market,	represented	for	Washington	Mutual	(WaMu),	one	of	the	leading
mortgage	suppliers,	“our	most	profitable	mortgage	loan”	(2003	–	see	page	107	of	this	report).
The	profitability	of	the	new	market	caused	the	lenders	to	offer	their	mortgage	negotiators	strong	incentives	to	sign	up
ever	less	credit-worthy	subprime	borrowers:	at	Federal	Reserve	hearings	in	San	Francisco	in	2006:
“Consumers	testified	to	being	sold	these	[flexible	‘option	ARM’	mortgages]	in	their	primary	non-English	language,
only	to	be	pressured	to	sign	English-only	documents	with	significantly	worse	terms.	Some	consumers	testified	to
being	unable	to	make	even	their	initial	payments	because	they	had	been	lied	to	so	completely	by	their	brokers.”
(Page	109	of	the	report.)
According	to	a	study	as	early	as	2003,	many	brokers	at	WaMu,	“felt	these	loans	were	’bad’	for	customers”.
Nevertheless,	these	subprime	option	ARM	originations	soared	from	$65	billion	in	2003	to	$255	billion	in	2006,	when
they	were	more	than	half	of	all	originations	(page	108	of	the	report).	In	impoverished	Detroit,	for	example,	68	per	cent
of	all	mortgages	were	subprime	(Deng,	Seymour,	Dewar	and	Manning	Thomas,	2017,	cited	in	Tooze,	op.cit.).
The	good	times	for	lenders	continued	while	the	home	price	boom	was	sustained.	And	they	needed	extra	funds	to
supply	this	new	market.
So	another	new	market	was	developed,	to	attract	funds	by	‘securitising’	mortgages:	mortgages	were	bundled	into
large	portfolios.	Investors	were	invited	to	choose	among	securities	representing	different	tranches	of	a	portfolio.	At
one	extreme	were	securities	which	would	be	first	to	take	any	hit	from	bad	loans	in	the	portfolio:	they	would	be	graded
by	the	credit	ratings	agencies	as	more	risky	–	say	BBB,	or	even	‘junk’,	and	be	compensated	with	a	high	interest	rate.
At	the	other	extreme	were	securities	which	would	suffer	only	if	all	the	loans	in	the	portfolio	failed:	these	would	be
rated	as	AAA	and	carry	a	lower	interest	rate.
The	banks	selling	the	securities	made	more	profit,	the	higher	the	ratings	on	their	securities.	The	ratings	agencies
were	therefore	under	huge	pressure	from	these	banks	to	inflate	the	rating.	When	asked	whether	the	investment
banks	threatened	to	withdraw	their	business	if	they	didn’t	get	their	desired	rating,	an	employee	of	Moody’s,	one	of	the
three	ratings	agencies,	replied:
“Oh	God,	are	you	kidding?	All	the	time.	I	mean	that’s	routine.	I	mean	they	would	threaten	you	all	the	time.	It’s	like…
Well,	next	time,	we’re	just	going	to	go	with	Fitch	and	S&P	[the	competitor	agencies].”(Page	210	of	the	report.)
The	conflicts	of	interest	were	acute.	It	was	the	sellers	of	the	securities,	the	banks,	who	paid	the	rating	fee,	not	the
buyers	who	relied	upon	them.	And	for	Moody’s	in	2007,	half	their	ratings	income	came	from	these	mortgage-backed
securities.	Moreover,	the	fee	for	rating	one	of	these	bonds	was	three	times	that	for	other	comparable	work	they	did	–
such	as	rating	a	corporate	bond.	(Page	118	of	the	report.)
Such	misalignment	of	incentives	was	typical	of	the	whole	supply	chain	of	subprime	mortgage	finance.	It	is
comparable	with	the	historic	business	models	of	suppliers	of	capital	equipment	such	as	aero	engines	or	earth-
movers.	Suppliers	used	to	make	much	of	their	profit	from	replacement	parts	when	their	products	broke	down:	their
interest	lay	in	equipment	failure.	Now	they	are	paid	instead	for	the	number	of	hours	of	efficient	operation,	and	their
interests	are	aligned	with	the	customer’s.
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The	Federal	Crisis	Inquiry	Commission	(FCIC)	report	an	example	of	the	lengths	to	which	the	credit	ratings	inflation
was	taken	under	the	dysfunctional	business	model.	Risky	tranches	of	many	mortgage	related	securities,	almost	half
of	them	rated	BBB	or	lower,	were	pooled	in	one	new	portfolio.	Seemingly	by	magic,	no	less	than	88	per	cent	of	the
tranches	of	the	new	portfolio	were	rated	AAA	(page	133	of	the	report).	The	implicit	rationale	was	again	diversification
–	that	only	a	very	small	proportion	of	the	underlying	mortgages	would	ever	fail.
Boom	to	bust
Many	insiders	were	skeptical	of	these	calculations.	In	her	fascinating	account	of	the	process,	Gillian	Tett	tells	of	a
Bear	Stearns	employee	who	described	such	products	to	investors/clients	as	an	“awesome	opportunity”;	but	wrote	in
an	email	to	a	colleague:
“I’m	fearful	of	these	markets…It’s	either	a	meltdown	or	the	greatest	buying	opportunity	ever.	I’m	leaning	more
towards	the	former.”	(GillianTett,	Fool’s	Gold,	2009,	pp198-9)
And	in	the	FCIC	deliberations,	Senator	Carl	Levin	pointed	out	that:
“Goldman	was	selling	securities	to	people	and	not	telling	them	that	they	[Goldman]	were	taking	and	intending	to
maintain	a	short	position	against	those	same	securities	[i.e.	betting	that	their	price	would	fall]”	(page	514	of	the
report).
The	housing	market	peaked,	then	fell	sharply.	Many	of	the	subprime	mortgages	were	‘delinquent’,	with	borrowers
unable	to	keep	up	their	payments	when	the	initial	teaser	interest	rates	expired.	And	the	market	value	of	the	houses
which	represented	collateral	fell	below	the	value	of	the	mortgage	loans.	65,000	homes	in	Detroit	alone	were
foreclosed;	of	these,	36,400	were	just	abandoned,	so	low	was	their	value	(Adam	Tooze,	op.	cit.,
p.450).	Correspondingly,	the	value	of	the	securities	backed	by	the	mortgages	fell,	so	that	US	and	foreign	banks
holding	them	saw	the	market	value	of	their	total	assets	shrink,	in	some	cases	below	the	value	of	their	liabilities.	In
many	instances	the	banks	were	only	saved	by	a	government	bailout.	But	bailout	had	been	denied	to	Lehman	on	that
fateful	day	ten	years	ago,	leading	to	widespread	panic	in	the	financial	markets,	domino	insolvencies	in	the	banking
sector,	and	massive	costs	in	the	wider	economy.
Where	were	compliance	and	the	CEO?
Apart	from	the	obvious	specific	question	whether	Lehman	should	have	been	rescued,	these	experiences	prompt
challenging	longer-term	general	questions,	including:
1.Where	were	the	monitoring/compliance	staff	in	this	story	of	conflicts	of	interest	and	misinformation	at	every	link	in
the	supply	chain	for	mortgages?
2.Why	did	those	insider	executives	who	thought	market	prices	of	mortgage-backed	securities	unjustifiably	high	not
move	out	of	the	mortgage-related	business?
On	the	first	question,	an	example	from	the	FCIC	bears	on	the	issue	we	are	pursuing,	of	whether	it	is	time	to	row	back
on	compliance.	In	June	2004	(long	before	the	market	turned),	New	Century’s	Quality	Assurance	staff	reported
“severe	underwriting	errors,	including	evidence	of	predatory	lending…	and	credit	issues,	in	25%	of	the	loans	they	had
audited…COO	[Chief	Operating	Officer],	and	later	CEO,	Brad	Morrice	recommended	that	these	results	be	removed
from	the	statistical	tools	used	to	tackle	loan	performance,	and	in	2005	the	department	was	dissolved	and	its
personnel	terminated”	(page	157	of	the	report).	So	much	for	the	compliance	function.
On	the	second	question,	the	analysis	of	the	GFC	by	Martin	Wolf,	the	Financial	Times’	formidable	chief	economics
commentator,	includes	a	famous	2007	quotation	from	Charles	‘Chuck’	Prince,	former	boss	of	the	mighty	Citigroup:
“When	the	music	stops,	in	terms	of	liquidity,	things	will	be	complicated.	But	as	long	as	the	music	is	playing,	you’ve
got	to	get	up	and	dance.	We’re	still	dancing.”
Wolf’s	comment	goes	to	the	heart	of	the	case	for	regulation,	explaining	how	laissez-faire	failed:
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“What	is	most	fascinating	about	the	now	notorious	remarks	by	Chuck	Prince,	the	man	who	led	Citigroup	into	the
disaster,	is	that	he	understood	what	might	happen	and	yet	he	felt	he	could	do	nothing	to	prevent	it.	Such	was	the
pressure	he	was	under,	both	from	shareholders	and	the	analysts	to	whom	they	listened,	that	he	dared	not	try	to
prevent	one	of	the	world’s	biggest,	most	complex	and	most	highly	interconnected	financial	groups	from	going	ever
closer	to	the	waterfall	he	could	see	ahead.	By	the	time	the	boat	went	over	the	edge,	a	month	later,	it	was	too	late.
The	government	ended	up	having	to	rescue	the	boat,	while	he	had	to	walk	the	plank,	albeit	with	the	consolation	of	a
pay-off	reported	at	$38	million.”
Information	asymmetry	and	market	failure
So	knowledgeable	insiders	repeatedly	withheld	crucial	information	from	their	clients.	Asymmetry	of	information	–
sellers	not	sharing	information	with	buyers	–	crops	up	at	every	stage	in	the	mortgage	supply	chain.	And	long	before
the	GFC,	economists	had	explained	the	challenges	that	information	asymmetry	poses	to	the	free	market
(unregulated)	model.
Nobel	Laureate	George	Akerlof	used	the	example	of	the	sale	of	‘lemons’	in	the	used	car	market	to	analyse	the	scope
of	the	detriment	arising	from	sellers	withholding	information	about	the	quality	of	the	goods	they	were	selling.	He
concluded	that	failure	to	disclose	threatened	to	undermine	the	whole	market,	with	the	costs	from	cheating	of	driving
legitimate	business	out	of	existence	often	exceeding	the	amount	by	which	the	seller	had	cheated	the	buyer.
Baruch	Lev	applied	the	argument	to	financial	markets	where	the	problem	of	assessing	the	quality	of	a	security	is
often	greater	than	that	of	assessing	a	used	car:
“At	the	extreme,	suspecting	gross	information	asymmetries,	uninformed	investors	may	quite	rationally	withdraw	from
trading…altogether.	A	massive	withdrawal	of	uninformed	investors	from	the	market	will…deprive	the	economy	of	the
allocational	and	risk-sharing	benefits	of	large	and	efficient	capital	markets.”	(Baruch	Lev,	The	Accounting	Review,
1988,	63:1,	p.7)
When	investors	in	the	markets	realised	they	had	been	misinformed	in	the	period	leading	up	to	the	GFC,	the
shrinkage	of	markets	was	rapid	and	massive.	Financial	markets	froze:	a	witness	to	the	FCIC	reported:	“The	REPO
market	[for	overnight	borrowing],	I	mean,	it	functioned	fine	up	until	one	day	it	just	didn’t	function”	(page	136	of	the
report).	And	the	panic	and	losses	spread	to	the	real	economy.
Bailout,	recession	and	austerity
In	Gillian	Tett’s	words,	“What	had…started	with	a	set	of	bad	loans	in	the	heartland	of	America’s	mortgage	market	had
now	spiralled	into	a	truly	global	financial	storm.”	“Millions	of	ordinary	families,	who	never	even	knew	that	CDOs
[sophisticated	mortgage-backed	securities]	existed,	far	less	deal	with	them,	have	suffered	shattering	financial	blows.”
(Gillian	Tett,	op.cit.,	p.281)
For	the	UK	it	has	been	estimated	that	the	present	value	of	total	lost	output	as	a	result	of	the	GFC	was	somewhere
“between	one	and	five	times	annual	GDP”.	A	much	more	drastic	collapse	was	only	avoided	by	wise	though	painful
government	intervention.	Apart	from	guarantee	commitments	of	over	a	trillion	pounds,	cash	bailout	payments	by	the
UK	government	alone	to	rescue	banks	reached	133	billion	pounds,	46	billion	pounds	to	rescue	just	RBS.
These	expenditures	inevitably	inflicted	great	damage	on	the	government	finances.	One	authoritative	study	concludes
that:
“Declining	revenues	and	higher	expenditures,	owing	to	a	combination	of	bailout	costs	and	higher	transfer	payments
and	debt	service	costs,	led	to	a	rapid	and	marked	worsening	of	the	fiscal	balance.”(Reinhart	and	Rogoff,
2009,	P.231,	quoted	in	Wolf)	In	the	UK,	the	government	borrowing	requirement	rose	from	around	3	per	cent	of	GDP
in	2007	to	over	11	per	cent	in	2009.	This	was	primarily	driven	by	the	banking	crisis,	not,	as	advocates	of	a	small	state
have	cleverly	but	misleadingly	maintained,	the	result	of	profligate	government	spending	in	general	(Martin	Wolf,
2015,	op.cit.	pp30-31.).
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Followed	by	falls	in	private	investment	and	–	on	the	argument	of	some	eminent	economists	–	an	over-zealous,	even
perverse,	government	austerity	programme,	the	GFC	heralded	years	of	stagnation	–	a	lost	decade.	The	Maddison
Project	and	the	Conference	Board	report	that	it	took	almost	eight	years	for	UK	real	GDP	per	head	to	recover	to	the
level	of	2007	–	an	even	weaker	recovery	than	was	achieved	in	the	Great	Depression,	when	the	1929	level	was
restored	within	five	years	(Martin	Wolf,	2015,	op.	cit.)
Some	have	argued	the	consequences	go	wider.	Adam	Tooze,	in	Crashed,	draws	some	comparisons	between	2008
and	1914	as	a	turning	point	in	western	history.	He	links	the	GFC	and	its	aftermath	to	dramatic	political	developments
including	the	United	States’	abdication	of	its	role	in	globalisation,	populism	in	Europe,	and	the	UK’s	Brexit.
Deregulate?
So,	ten	years	on	from	Lehman,	is	it	now	time	to	row	back	on	regulation	and	compliance	activities	in	the	financial
sector?	Has	the	prospect	of	another	‘Lehman	moment’	disappeared?	In	some	respects,	times	are	better	compared
with	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	crisis.	So	why	not	ease	up?
Distinguished	economists	who	have	studied	violent	financial	crashes	sound	an	alarm.
Martin	Wolf	reminds	us	of	the	repeated	cycle	of	boom	and	bust	in	financial	markets:	in	“good	times,	when	people	are
prone	to	believing	just	about	anything,	the	level	of	fraud	rises,	but	it	mostly	remains	invisible.	In	bad	times,	when
people	want	their	money	back,	the	fraud	is	revealed.”	(Martin	Wolf,	2015,	op.cit.,	p.122.)
And	he	draws	on	experience	of	an	earlier	shattering	financial	crisis	with	a	quotation	from	Galbraith’s	book	on	the
1929	stock-market	crash:
“In	good	times,	people	are	relaxed,	trusting,	and	money	is	plentiful.	But	even	though	money	is	plentiful,	there	are
always	people	who	need	more.	Under	these	circumstances	the	rate	of	embezzlement	grows,	the	rate	of	discovery
falls	off,	and	the	bezzle	[embezzlement]	increases	rapidly.”	The	case	for	watchfulness	and	skepticism,	regulation	and
compliance,	is	stronger	than	in	bad	times:	“In	depressions	all	this	is	reversed.	Money	is	watched	with	a	narrow,
suspicious	eye.	The	man	who	handles	it	is	assumed	to	be	dishonest	until	he	proves	himself	otherwise.	Audits	are
penetrating	and	meticulous.	Commercial	morality	is	enormously	improved.”	(John	Kenneth	Galbraith,	The	Great
Crash	of	1929,	(Boston	and	New	York,	Mariner,	1997,	p.133))
So	it	is	because	the	good	times	are	precisely	when	misconduct	flourishes	that	it	is	then	most	dangerous	to	drop	your
guard	in	regulation	and	compliance.
[i]	The	background	to	the	CFPB	affair	is	that	Mr	Cordray	had	led	the	CFPB	in	imposing	a	$185	million	fine	on	Wells
Fargo.	Their	misconduct?	Two	million	‘phantom’	accounts	were	created	in	clients’	names	without	the	clients	knowing.
Junior	staff	had	been	responding	to	pressure	to	meet	tough	targets	for	opening	fresh	accounts.	5,300	junior	staff
were	fired	for	misconduct.	The	bank’s	CEO	insisted	that	the	misconduct	had	never	been	brought	to	his	attention.	The
bank’s	top	five	executives	had	received	$45	million	in	performance-related	pay	since	2012.
♣♣♣
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